gdanmitchell
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 p.12 #13 · EOS-R5....will it live up to the hype? | |
dmcphoto wrote, first quoting a sentence from my earlier post:
"Nikon also had 36MP in the D800, but more on that it moment."
I think that's a reasonable perspective regarding Sony's rise in the camera market, but I'm still waiting for the part about Nikon, which has more similarities to Canon than Sony. I know Nikon used Sony manufactured image sensors, and it was the lack of modern (BSI) sensor technology that held Canon back, but lack of technology is what it is, and not a compelling "excuse". Note that I'm talking about camera performance here, not market share, which is more a product of marketing than technology.
Nikon released the 36MP D800/D800E in 2012 while I was waiting for Canon to release a 1DsMkIV, which never happened. In 2014 when Nikon released the D810 I was still waiting for a Canon product that was comparable, or at least had better IQ at low ISO than my 2007 vintage 1DsMkIII. In 2015 Canon at long last released the 5DSR, their first camera in 7 years to exceed the 1DsMkIII low ISO IQ. Seven years is a long time to wait, and the only improvements were resolution and usability features like better rear LCD, etc. It still wasn't up to the Nikon D810, but at least there was some progress. Two years later Nikon released the D850 with 45.7 MP, lower noise and best in class DR, and 7 FPS (9FPS with a battery grip), 2 FPS and 4 FPS respectively higher than the 5DSR with only 4 MP less resolution.
From my perspective it was as if Canon was asleep and snoring loudly between 2007 and 2016 when the 5DMKIV was released. That camera is only slightly behind Nikon's D850 in terms of DR, further behind in terms of resolution, and comparable in frame rate. Only now, in 2020, are we starting to see class leading specification rumors from Canon. ...Show more →
My apologies for including that sentence and then not following up! I could say that I forgot. ;-) Or that the post was already too long by the time I finished it!
However, since I wrote that and you brought it up, I'll try to fill in here.
A few things...
Note that while Sony specifically targeted Canon as the company from which they would take market share, they arguably did not do so with Nikon. For example, while it was pretty easy (and very common!) for Canon users to stick their lenses on the Sony system, it didn't work that way for Nikon users.
So let's say that you were a person shooting an existing DSLR system from Canon or Nikon. How strong would the case be for trying out or moving to Sony?
For the Canon user, pretty strong and in several ways. You may have felt that you were "falling behind" on the sensor resolution front, and the 36MP sensor had close to double the number of photo sites. While switching brands for most folks already invested in a brand is a daunting prospect, usually requiring the replacement of expensive lenses, electronic flash, and other odds and ends... here you could keep virtually all of those things and try it out for the price of a body alone. That also meant that you could probably ease the transition by keeping your Canon body "just in case" as you tried the new thing.
Let's say that you were a Nikon user. In your case you could get everything but a mirrorless body (the ability to use your existing lenses, the higher MP sensor) simply by purchasing a D800 or similar body from Nikon, with no concerns about compatibility or how well your new camera would interface with your lenses. On top of that, as I understand it, there was not really a path to bringing your Nikon lenses over to the Sony body with ostensibly good performance.
From Sony's point of view, I suspect that there were good reasons to not go after Nikon in the same way they went after Canon. First, the largest existing base of users who could become Sony customers by bringing their existing lenses along to a Sony camera was Canon photographers. My thinking is that Sony's main initial goal was to get traction without having to introduce a full lens line-up along with the new camera, and for that Canon was the better target. Second, if Sony had introduced their own Nikon lens adapter (which I understand would have involved some technical challenges) this would have added complexity to the system without adding a whole lot of new users. Third, since Sony was producing Nikon's sensor at this point, it would benefit them far less to potentially diminish the success of a company that was buying sensors from them.
I get it when you write that "it was as if Canon was asleep." I do think that Canon did not clearly see how quickly Sony would change the rules (with higher performance sensors, and with the successful introduction of FF mirrorless), but given their position in the market they no doubt looked at things differently. And, again, keep in mind that Canon could not possibly have successfully used the Sony strategy (a camera with lots of rough edges, issues with AF with existing lenses, requirement to use an adapter, interface problems, etc) and been successful. The market would overlook these things with a newcomer like Sony, but a camera with those issues, no matter how revolutionary the underlying promise, would have failed spectacularly in the market. Again, just imagine the exact same camera and scenario of the A7rII... but put a Canon logo on that camera... and imagine the damning reviews of "Canon's" new technology experiment!
So, it isn't unfair to suggest that Canon appeared to have been a bit too complacent about the possibility that were on the horizon, and may not have realized until it was too late that Sony was going to make lightening strike in the rather brilliant way they did with the A7rII. I'm convinced that once that happened, Canon had only a limited number of options.
1. Cede the market for mirrorless cameras to Sony and prepare to exit the high end camera market. (Not. Going. To. Happen.)
2. Rush out a "me too" product that would fail to meet the expectations of Canon's market, a product that would likely have been panned and thus fail to do anything to counter Sony's brilliant move.
3. Knuckle down and set in motion a longer term development process that would lead to a state-of-the art mirrorless system — too late to stop Sony's initial push, but in time to effectively counter it and retain the largest share of the market.
Note that throughout all of this, Nikon is barely a factor aside from being a good customer for Sony's sensors and a continuing (though troubled) competitor to Canon.
For an interesting analogy, look at Apple and the very early smartphone market. Early on there were a bunch of companies that were very successful in that market. They had been quick to get products to market, and then they worked to improve them over time. There were rumors that Apple was working on a product, but nothing solid. (And Jobs more or less denied that they were doing it.) As time went on and there was nothing from Apple, the pundits began to pronounce that "Apple is too late to this market" and. that the window had closed.
But, while the analogy isn't perfect, what Apple did was more like what Canon has to do here, and what it looks like Canon may be doing. Basically, rather than rushing out a reactive product with rough edges to immediately compete in that new market, Apple set in motion a very big and very serious development project that led to what seemed like quite a revolutionary and solid product from the first introduction. The rest is, as they say, history. (Anyone bought a Motorola smart phone recently? ;-) )
Dan
As always, nothing I write here is intended to denigrate any of the mentioned manufacturers or their products. All three produce excellent photographic equipment, and there are excellent photographers producing great work with each of them.
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Many of the beloved in Canon find the form factor a hallmark of the body.